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Abstract—We consider a decentralized detection network
whose aim is to infer a public hypothesis of interest. However,
the raw sensor observations also allow the fusion center to
infer private hypotheses that we wish to protect. We consider
the case where there are an uncountable number of private
hypotheses belonging to an uncertainty set, and develop local
privacy mappings at every sensor so that the sanitized sensor
information minimizes the Bayes error of detecting the public
hypothesis at the fusion center, while achieving information
privacy for all private hypotheses. We introduce the concept
of a most favorable hypothesis (MFH) and show how to find
a MFH in the set of private hypotheses. By protecting the
information privacy of the MFH, information privacy for every
other private hypothesis is also achieved. We provide an iterative
algorithm to find the optimal local privacy mappings, and derive
some theoretical properties of these privacy mappings. Simulation
results demonstrate that our proposed approach allows the
fusion center to infer the public hypothesis with low error while
protecting information privacy of all the private hypotheses.
Index Terms—Information privacy, decentralized hypothesis
testing, decentralized detection, Internet of Things
I. INTRODUCTION
With a burgeoning number of IoT devices penetrating into
all aspects of our lives [1]–[6], privacy-related issues are
attracting increasing interest [7]–[12]. Users of these devices
worry about being watched, listened to, or tracked by wearable
devices and smart home appliances [13]. Sensitive personal
data like lifestyle preferences and location information may
be abused for unwanted advertisement purposes or for more
nefarious objectives like unauthorized surveillance. In China,
for example, over 20 million surveillance cameras equipped
artificial intelligence have been installed. The new surveillance
system have raised fears among citizens that the technology is
being used to monitor their daily lives [14]. To put consumers
at ease and to encourage adoption of IoT technologies, privacy
consideration should be incorporated into the core design of
IoT solutions, with users being given more control over what
information can be shared with the service providers.
We model an IoT network consisting of multiple devices
using the decentralized detection framework [15]–[21] as
shown in Fig. 1 (technical details are presented in Section II).
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Fig. 1: An IoT network with public hypothesis H and private
hypothesis G. Each sensor t makes a local observation Xt that
is mapped to Zt, which is then sent to the fusion center.
In this model, IoT devices or sensors make observations X =
(X1, . . . , Xs), where Xt is the local observation of sensor
t ∈ {1, . . . , s}. Each sensor then maps its local observation Xt
to Zt and send that to a fusion center or service provider. The
fusion center uses Z = (Z1, . . . , Zs) to infer a hypothesis of
interest H , which is also called a public hypothesis. However,
since the sensor information Z may also be used by the
fusion center to infer other hypotheses G that the user may
not have given authorization for (which are known as private
hypotheses), sending unsanitized sensor information Z = X to
the fusion center may result in privacy leakage. For example,
on-body wearables containing accelerometers and gyroscopes
can be used to measure a person’s movements and pose in
order to detect falls. However, the sensor information may
also be used to detect other activities performed by the person,
leading to loss of privacy.
In this paper, we investigate the case where the fusion
center is authorized to infer a public hypothesis H based
on sensor information that is sanitized in such a way that
makes it difficult for the fusion center to infer an infinite set
of private hypotheses. To define the set of private hypotheses,
we consider an uncertainty set [22] defined around a nominal
private hypothesis. This is because in most applications, one
can define a specific public hypothesis, but it may be difficult
for a user to specify multiple private hypotheses that she
wants to protect. Our goal is to design local privacy mappings
Xt 7→ Zt at each sensor t to protect the information privacy
[23] of private hypotheses that are “close” (in a specific
sense as defined in Section II) to the nominal hypothesis. We
can interpret this framework as providing robust privacy for
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2the nominal private hypothesis, in the same spirit as robust
hypothesis testing [22], [24]–[26].
A. Related Work
Various works [27]–[39] have investigated privacy preser-
vation under different contexts, including privacy mechanisms
for accessing databases and performing computations in cloud-
based systems. All these works develop privacy techniques for
centralized platforms where a trusted data curator is assumed
to be available. In this paper, our aim is to develop privacy
mechanisms for sensors in a decentralized network shown in
Fig. 1.
In a decentralized platform, without a trusted data curator,
each sensor t performs a local privacy mapping to sanitize
its own data Xt before sending a sanitized version Zt to
a fusion center. The sanitized information Z still enables
the fusion center to detect H , while not disclosing private
information G to the fusion center. The papers [37], [40]–
[44] propose methods to achieve (local) differential privacy,
while the works [31], [45]–[47] investigate privacy-preserving
distributed data analytics. Other works resort to cryptographic
techniques like Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) [48],
partially homomorphic encryption [49] and CryptoNets [50],
[51] to encrypt information from each sensor while allowing
the fusion center to perform computations on the sensors’
ciphertext. All the abovementioned methods aim at protecting
data privacy, so that the raw data X is not accessible by the
fusion center. In this case, either statistical inference based
on Z of a private hypothesis is still feasible, or inference of
the public hypothesis becomes severely degraded since data
privacy does not distinguish between the public and private
hypotheses [20].
Information privacy as a metric to prevent statistical infer-
ence was first proposed by [23]. Information privacy ensures
that the prior probability and posterior probability of a private
hypothesis are similar. In [21], [52], [53], a nonparametric
learning approach is proposed to determine the local sensor
privacy mappings. The proposed approaches protect the in-
formation privacy of a single private hypothesis, while still
allowing the fusion center to infer the public hypothesis
with high accuracy. In this paper, we develop local privacy
mappings for the sensors to protect the information privacy of
an uncountable set of hypotheses close to a nominal private
hypothesis. In contrast to [21], [52], [53], in this paper we
consider parametric inference instead to quantify the utility-
privacy trade-off. Furthermore, although the methods in [21],
[52], [53] can be extended to a finite set of private hypotheses,
they cannot be easily generalized to handle an uncountable set
of private hypotheses.
Robust detection was first proposed by [22]. The paper [24]
finds a general solution for the minimax test between two
composite hypotheses. In [25], robust decentralized detection
is considered in an asymptotic setting, where independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) sensor observations is assumed.
In all these works, a minimax test between a pair of represen-
tative simple hypotheses is conducted. In this paper, we study
privacy-aware decentralized detection, in both non-asymptotic
[15] and asymptotic [16] settings. Similar to the previous
works, we use a representative pair of hypotheses when
seeking robust privacy preservation for the private hypotheses.
However, different from the previous works, where the main
focus is to find a pair of distributions that is the hardest
to distinguish, the focus of our paper is to find a private
hypothesis in the uncertainty set that is the easiest to detect.
The paper [54] considers robust utility-privacy tradeoffs but
does not use the term “robust” in the same context as this
paper. Specifically, the authors do not consider an uncertainty
set but instead characterize utility-privacy tradeoffs under
different source distribution classes.
B. Our Contributions
In this paper, we develop a privacy-preserving framework
for a decentralized detection network. Our main contributions
are as follows.
1) We introduce an uncertainty set to define an uncountable
set of private hypotheses that are close in a specific
sense to a nominal private hypothesis. We provide bounds
for the Bayes error probability of detecting the public
hypothesis.
2) We introduce the concept of a most favorable hypothesis
(MFH), which is the hypothesis within the uncertainty set
that is the easiest (in terms of the average Type I and II
errors) to infer. By preserving the information privacy of
the MFH, we achieve a guaranteed level of information
privacy for all hypotheses within the uncertainty set. We
show how to find a MFH.
3) We propose an iterative optimization algorithm to find
the local privacy mappings at every sensor that achieve
the optimal trade-off between utility (the Bayes error of
detecting the public hypothesis) and information privacy
for the set of private hypotheses. We show that each
local privacy mapping is a randomization between at
most two deterministic mappings. Under the asymptotic
setting where the number of sensors goes to infinity,
we show that the optimal sensor privacy mapping is a
randomization between two deterministic sensor decision
rules.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present our system model and introduce an uncertainty
set to define the set of private hypotheses whose information
privacy we wish to protect. In Section III, we present a
bound on the utility and propose a series of relaxation steps.
We also introduce and develop the concept of a MFH. In
Section IV, we propose an algorithm to solve for the optimal
sensor privacy mappings. Simulation results are presented in
Section V, and we conclude in Section VI.
Notations: We use capital letters like X to denote random
variables or vectors, lowercase letters like x for deterministic
scalars, and boldface lowercase letters like x for deterministic
vectors. The set Γc denotes the complement of the set Γ. We
use pX(·) to denote the probability mass function of X , and
pX|Y (· | ·) to denote the conditional probability mass function
of X given Y . P denotes a generic probability measure, which
will be clear from the context. We use ‖·‖TV to denote total
variation distance and I(· ; ·) to denote mutual information.
3II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a decentralized detection network as shown in
Fig. 1. The hypothesis H ∈ {0, 1} is the public hypothesis
that the fusion center is authorized to infer, while G◦ ∈
{0, 1} represents a private hypothesis that we wish to protect.
Each sensor t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s} makes a noisy observation
Xt ∈ X = {1, 2, . . . , |X |}, which is summarized using a
randomized local decision rule or privacy mapping qt : X 7→
Z = {1, 2, . . . , |Z|} to obtain Zt = qt(Xt), before being
sent to the fusion center. We interpret the privacy mapping qt
as a conditional probability qt(zt | xt) = pZt|Xt(zt | xt).
We assume that conditioned on Xt, Zt is independent of
everything else, and min
h∈{0,1}
pH(h) > 0. Based on the received
Z = (Zt)
s
t=1, the fusion center infers the public hypothesis
H using the Bayes detector γH(Z). We denote X = (Xt)st=1
and let Q be the set of pZ|X such that
pZ|X(z | x) =
s∏
t=1
qt(zt | xt), (1a)∑
zt∈Z
qt(zt | xt) = 1, (1b)
qt(zt | xt) ≥ 0, (1c)∑
xt∈X
qt(zt|xt) ≥ ∆, (1d)
∀ xt ∈ X , zt ∈ Z, t = 1, . . . , s,
where ∆ ≤ |X |/|Z| is a small positive constant. We impose
the constraint in (1d) to ensure that every zt ∈ Z has a positive
probability mass because otherwise a smaller |Z| could have
been used. Note that ∆ has to be chosen no bigger than
|X |/|Z| since otherwise |X | = ∑zt,xt qt(zt|xt) > |X |, a
contradiction.
A. Uncertainty Set
Given pX,H,G◦ , we define the utility to be the negative
of the Bayes error P (γH(Z) 6= H) in inferring H so that
maximizing the utility over Q means minimizing the Bayes
error. Our goal is to find a pZ|X ∈ Q to achieve an optimal
trade-off between the utility of inferring H and protecting
the privacy of G◦. However, in practice, it may be hard for
a user to specify a particular G◦ to protect. Furthermore,
there could be a model mismatch. For example, G◦ may
correspond to a particular sensitive phenomenon but during
the actual operation of the sensor network, a related but
different phenomenon is realized instead. Therefore, instead
of considering only G◦, we consider the privacy protection of
all binary hypotheses G that are close to G◦ in the following
sense. We call G◦ the nominal private hypothesis.
Definition 1. For a given pX|G◦ and an uncertainty parameter
δ ∈ [0, 1), the uncertainty set G(pX|G◦ , δ) of private hypothe-
ses with respect to (w.r.t.) the nominal hypothesis G◦ is given
by
G(pX|G◦ , δ) =
{
G : min
g∈{0,1}
pG(g) > 0,
pX|G(x | g) = (1− δ)pX|G◦(x | g) + δfg(x),
fg ∈ SX s , g ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ X s
}
,
(2)
where SX s is the set of probability mass functions over X s.
Remark 1. Definition 1 utilizes the concept of a contamination
uncertainty class from the robust detection literature [22],
[25], [26]. A more general definition of an uncertainty class
with desirable properties (e.g., the existence of a pair of least
favorable distributions (LFDs) for the two uncertainty classes
{pX|G(· | 0)} and {pX|G(· | 1)}) is the set of distributions
upper bounded by a 2-alternating capacity [24], which includes
as special cases the contamination uncertainty set used in
Definition 1, and the uncertainty class consisting of G such
that pX|G is within a fixed total variation distance of pX|G◦ .
Generalizing Definition 1 to utilize 2-alternating capacities
is out of the scope of this paper, and is part of our future
work. Using contamination uncertainty class is also easier to
interpret in practice and leads to the following natural result
in Proposition 1.
We assume that G◦ ∈ G(pX|G◦ , δ). We note that
G(pX|G◦ , δ) is an uncountable set if δ > 0. Abusing notation,
to avoid clutter, we sometimes denote G(pX|G◦ , δ) as GX if δ
and G◦ are clear from the context.
We also assume for some α > 0,
pX|G◦(x|g) ≥ α,∀ x ∈ X s and g ∈ {0, 1}. (3)
The assumption in (3) is to avoid the trivial case where the
nominal private hypothesis G◦ is perfectly detectable for some
observations x.
In the example of fall detection using on-body wearables
described in Section I, the public hypothesis H is whether the
person has fallen or not. The raw sensor information X from
the on-body wearables may be able to let the fusion center
infer whether the person is performing a specific exercise
like running, doing sit-ups, weight training, climbing stairs,
etc. Suppose we define G◦ to be the hypothesis that the
person is running at a particular constant speed v. Then, the
uncertainty set G(pX|G◦ , δ) consists of exercise hypotheses
that are related to running from the sensors’ perspective. To
be more specific, depending on the value of δ chosen, the
uncertainty set G(pX|G◦ , δ) can include hypotheses like the
person is running at an average speed close to v, the person
is running up a flight of stairs at a speed similar to v, or the
person is performing jumping jacks at a rate that generates
similar but “noisier” sensor readings X than running at speed
v.
The motivation for our Definition 1 is to protect all hypothe-
ses that generate similar sensor observations as the nominal
hypothesis G◦. In this paper, for simplicity, we consider
only a single private hypothesis uncertainty set, although our
framework can be extended to include multiple uncertainty sets
defined around multiple or M -ary nominal private hypotheses
(see Remarks 4 and 5 later).
4Proposition 1. Let g∗ = arg ming=0,1 pG◦(g) and
Fpi = {G : pG|G◦(0 | 1) ≤ pi, pG|G◦(1 | 0) ≤ pi},
where
pi < min{pG◦(g∗),min
x,g
pX|G◦(x | g)}.
Then Fpi ⊂ G(pX|G◦ , δ), where
δ = 1− pG◦(g∗)− pi
(1− pi)pG◦(g∗)
(
1− pi
minx,g pX|G◦(x | g)
)
. (4)
Proof: See Appendix A.
In Proposition 1, we can interpret Fpi to the set of outputs
after passing G◦ through binary symmetric channels [55,
Chapter 7.1] each of whose crossover probability is not more
than pi. Therefore, G ∈ Fpi ⊂ G(pX|G◦ , δ) is a “noisy” version
of G◦.
B. Information Privacy and Optimization Problem Formula-
tion
Our goal is to prevent statistical inference of all G ∈ GX .
We choose information privacy [23] as the privacy metric
because [20] has shown that the information privacy metric
is one of the strongest privacy metrics that protects against
statistical inference. The definition of information privacy is
reproduced from [23] as follows.
Definition 2 (Information privacy). For  > 0, G given Z or
pG|Z has -information privacy, if for any (g, z), we have
e− ≤ pG|Z(g | z)
pG(g)
≤ e. (5)
The value  is called the information privacy budget.
Definition 2 essentially says that the received information
Z at the fusion center does not provide much information
about G in addition to what the fusion center already knows
about it. Therefore, it is difficult to statistically infer G
given only Z. Definition 2 is similar to but different from
the maximal realizable leakage defined in [38, Definition 4].
The maximal realizable leakage is shown to be equivalent
to maxx,z pZ|X(z|x)/pZ(z), which is related to the local
differential privacy of the sensor data X [38] and protects all
possible hypotheses including H . This privacy notion is too
strong for our purposes as we are interested in only protecting
the privacy of those hypotheses closely related to the nominal
private hypothesis G◦, while allowing the inference of H .
Our optimization problem is formulated as follows: for a
privacy budget  > 0, we aim to
min
γH ,pZ|X∈Q
P (γH(Z) 6= H) (6a)
s.t. e− ≤ pZ|G(z | g)
pZ(z)
≤ e, (6b)
∀ G ∈ G(pX|G◦ , δ), g ∈ {0, 1}, z ∈ Zs,
where we have made use of the equality pG|Z(g | z)/pG(g) =
pZ|G(z | g)/pZ(z). Note that here, P (γH(Z) 6= H) is the
Bayes error w.r.t. the probability distributions pX,H,G◦ and
pZ|X .
Remark 2. The objective function in (6a) can be replaced by
E(γH , pZ|X)
where E is a general loss function, examples of which are the
following. Let P (γ(Z) 6= H; pX,H,G) denote the Bayes error
for inferring H w.r.t. a given pX,H,G, pZ|X and γ.
(a) The formulation in (6a) uses E =
P (γ(Z) 6= H; pX,H,G◦) where the Bayes error is
w.r.t. a given pX,H,G◦ .
(b) If a prior distribution over G ∈ G(pX|G◦ , δ) is known,
a Bayesian formulation with E = EG[P (γ(Z) 6=
H; pX,H,G)], where the expectation is taken over all the
private hypotheses G ∈ G(pX|G◦ , δ) can be used.
(c) A minimax or robust formulation involves assuming that
each pX,H,G belongs to an uncertainty class
P = {pX,H,G = pG◦ · pX|G · pH|X,G◦ :
G ∈ G(pX|G◦ , δ)
}
and letting
E = max
pX,H,G∈P
P (γH(Z) 6= H; pX,H,G) .
It is easy to see that for any pX,H,G ∈ P , x ∈ X s,
h ∈ {0, 1},
pX|H(x|h)
∝ (1− δ)
∑
g
pX,H,G◦(x, h, g) + δf(x, h), (7)
where f(x, h) is some joint probability mass function for
(X,H). Then minimizing E is equivalent to the robust
detection of H in [22] over the contamination uncertainty
classes defined by the class of distributions {pX|H(· | 0)}
and {pX|H(· | 1)} of the form given in (7) as f(x, h)
varies over all possible distributions. The loss function
E can then be simplified by finding the pair of LFDs
of these two classes, which correspond to a G′ so that
E = P (γ(Z) 6= H; pX,H,G′), which is similar to case (a).
Since the focus of this paper is on robust information privacy,
we use case (a) for illustrative purposes throughout this paper.
III. ERROR BOUNDS AND OPTIMIZATION RELAXATION
In this section, we first present bounds on the utility in
the optimization problem (6). We then propose a series of
steps to relax (6), and introduce the concept of a MFH, which
simplifies our final optimization formulation significantly.
A. Error Bounds
Theorem 1. Suppose that H has a uniform prior probability
distribution under pX,H,G◦ . Then, the objective function in (6)
satisfies
1
2
− (e
 − 1)∥∥pX|H(· | 0)− pX|H(· | 1)∥∥TV
2 minG∈GX{max{mG, e − 1}}
≥ min
γH ,pZ|X∈Q
P (γH(Z) 6= H)
≥ 1
2
−
√
I(H;X | G◦) + 
2
, (8)
5where pX|H(x | h) =
∑
g=0,1 pX,G◦|H(x, g | h)/2, and for
each G ∈ GX with corresponding joint distribution pX,H,G,
mG = max
{
|aG(g)− bG(g)|, |cG(g)− dG(g)| : g ∈ {0, 1}
}
,
aG(g) =
∑
x∈I+
(
pX|G(x | g)− epX(x;G)
)
,
bG(g) =
∑
x∈I−
(
pX|G(x | g)− epX(x;G)
)
,
cG(g) =
∑
x∈I+
(
e−pX(x;G)− pX|G(x | g)
)
,
dG(g) =
∑
x∈I−
(
e−pX(x;G)− pX|G(x | g)
)
,
for g = 0, 1, and
pX(x;G) =
∑
g=0,1
pX|G(x | g)pG(g),
I+ = {x ∈ X s : pX|H(x | 0)− pX|H(x | 1) ≥ 0},
I− = {x ∈ X s : pX|H(x | 0)− pX|H(x | 1) < 0}.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 3. From the proof of Theorem 1, the lower bound in
(8) can be generalized to case (b) in Remark 2 by replacing
I(H;X | G◦) (defined using pX,H,G◦ ) with I(H;X | G) (de-
fined using pX,H,G) and taking expectation w.r.t. G. Similarly,
it can be generalized to case (c) in Remark 2 by replacing
I(H;X | G◦) with I(H,X | G′) (see Remark 2 for definition
of G′).
Both the bounds in Theorem 1 approach to 1/2 as  → 0,
which is expected as a budget  = 0 means perfect information
privacy. We present numerical results in Section V to show the
behavior of these bounds for different I(X;H).
B. Privacy Constraint Relaxation
The optimization problem (6) is a semi-infinite program-
ming [56, (1)]. Without the constraints (6b), it is already a NP-
complete problem [57]. In the following, we present a series
of relaxations so that a simple person-by-person optimization
(PBPO) approach can be developed (see Section IV).
For any fusion rule γG used to infer G at the fusion center,
let
RG(pZ|X , γG) =
1
2
(
P (γG(Z) = 0 |G = 1)
+ P (γG(Z) = 1 |G = 0)
)
, (9)
be the average of its Type I and Type II detection error
probabilities for G. Note that we are not assuming pG(0) =
pG(1) = 1/2. As will be clear from the following discussion
and (6b) itself, the prior distribution of G does not affect the
information privacy constraint in (6b). For any z ∈ Zs and
hypothesis G, let
`Z|G(z) =
pZ|G(z | 1)
pZ|G(z | 0) .
From [21, Proposition 1], to achieve -information privacy
for G ∈ GX , it suffices to ensure that
min
γG
RG(pZ|X , γG) ≥ θG, (10)
where θG = (1− cG(1− e−))/2 with
cG = min
{
P
(
Z ∈ arg min
z∈Zs
`Z|G(z) | G = 0
)
,
P
(
Z ∈ arg max
z∈Zs
`Z|G(z) | G = 1
)}
.
The value cG corresponds to the minimum probability of the
fusion center making the correct inference about G over all
realizations of Z. For example, if Z = z minimizes `Z|G(·),
then the fusion center makes the correct inference that G = 0.
We have
min
G∈GX
cG ≥ min
G∈GX ,z∈Zs,g∈{0,1}
pZ|G(z|g)
= min
G,z,g
∑
x∈X s
pZ|X(z|x)pX|G(x|g)
≥ (1− δ) min
z,g
∑
x∈X s
pZ|X(z|x)pX|G◦(x|g)
≥ (1− δ)α∆,
where the penultimate inequality follows from the definition
(2) and the last inequality is due to the assumptions (1d)
and (3). Let
θ =
1
2
(
1− (1− e−)(1− δ)α∆) . (11)
Then, θ ≥ θG for all G ∈ GX . Therefore, by requiring that
min
G∈GX ,γG
RG(pZ|X , γG) ≥ θ, (12)
the information privacy constraints (6b) for all G ∈ GX are
satisfied. To further simplify the constraint (12), we note that
for any privacy mapping pZ|X ∈ Q,
G(pX|G◦ , δ) ⊂ GZ , G(pZ|G◦ , δ),
since pX|G(x | g) = (1 − δ)pX|G◦(x | g) + δfg(x) implies
that
pZ|G(z|g) =
∑
x∈X s
pZ|X(z|x)pX|G(x|g)
= (1− δ)pZ|G◦(z | g) + δf ′g(z),
where f ′g(z) =
∑
x∈X s pZ|X(z|x)fg(x) ∈ SZs .
Therefore, our optimization problem (6) is relaxed to:
min
γH ,pZ|X∈Q
P (γH(Z) 6= H) (13a)
s.t. min
G∈GZ ,γG
RG(pZ|X , γG) ≥ θ. (13b)
It turns out that there exists a “worst-case” hypothesis in the
set GZ so that achieving (13b) for this hypothesis implies
information privacy for all other hypotheses in GZ with the
same privacy budget. We discuss how to find this “worst-case”
hypothesis in the next subsection.
6C. Most Favorable Hypothesis (MFH)
In this subsection, we introduce the notion of a MFH w.r.t.
the privacy mapping pZ|X . It is well known [58, Section II.B]
that the decision rule γ∗G minimizing (9) over all γG is given
by
γ∗G(z) =
{
1, if `Z|G(z) ≥ 1,
0, otherwise.
Recall that RG(pZ|X , γG) is defined in (9).
Definition 3. For a privacy mapping pZ|X ∈ Q, if there exists
a hypothesis G ∈ GZ , such that
RG(pZ|X , γ∗G) = min
G′∈GZ
RG′(pZ|X , γ∗G′),
then we call G a MFH w.r.t. pZ|X , and pZ|G a most favorable
distribution (MFD) w.r.t. GZ .
The definitions of MFH and MFD mirror Huber’s definition
of a pair of least favorable distributions (LFD) [22]. While
the LFD is defined for a pair of uncertainty classes within a
hypothesis, our MFH and MFD are defined for an uncertainty
set of hypotheses. Similar to [22], we show below that a MFH
always exists and give an explicit construction of a MFD.
Theorem 2. For any privacy mapping pZ|X ∈ Q and GZ =
G(pZ|G◦ , δ), we have
min
G∈GZ
RG(pZ|X , γ∗G) = (1− δ)RG◦(pZ|X , γ∗G◦), (14)
and a MFD pZ|GMF is given by
pZ|GMF(z | 0)
=
{
A1(1− δ)pZ|G◦(z | 1), z = z
(1− δ)pZ|G◦(z | 0), otherwise,
(15a)
pZ|GMF(z | 1)
=
{
A2(1− δ)pZ|G◦(z | 0), z = z¯
(1− δ)pZ|G◦(z | 1), otherwise,
(15b)
where
z = arg min
z
`Z|G◦(z),
z¯ = arg max
z
`Z|G◦(z),
A1 =
δ
1−δ + pZ|G◦(z | 0)
pZ|G◦(z | 1) ,
A2 =
δ
1−δ + pZ|G◦(z¯ | 1)
pZ|G◦(z¯ | 0) ,
with z and z¯ randomly chosen from the set of minimizers and
maximizers, respectively, if they are not unique.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Theorem 2 provides a MFD w.r.t. GZ , but the MFD may
not be unique (consider for example the case where there
are more than one z that minimize `Z|G◦(z)). Given a MFD
pZ|GMF , the corresponding MFH GMF is also not unique (the
MFH distribution pGMF is any binary distribution satisfying
the conditions in the uncertainty set definition in Definition 1
and pX|GMF may not be uniquely determined by pZ|GMF ).
However, (14) always holds, which allows us to replace
the constraint (13b) with a simpler constraint to obtain the
following optimization problem:
min
γH ,pZ|X∈Q
P (γH(Z) 6= H) (16a)
s.t. min
γ◦G
RG◦(pZ|X , γG◦) ≥ θ
1− δ . (16b)
Remark 4. In this paper, we have assumed binary private
hypotheses for simplicity. To generalize to M -ary private hy-
potheses, suppose that every G ∈ GX has range {0, 1, . . . ,M−
1}. For a detector γG,g at the fusion center that distinguishes
between the hypothesis pair G = 0 and G = g, where
1 ≤ g ≤M − 1, let
RG,g(pZ|X , γG,g) =
1
2
(
P (γG,g(Z) = g | G = 0)
+ P (γG,g(Z) = 0 | G = g)
)
.
Then, from [21, Theorem 2] and the discussions above, to
achieve information privacy for all G ∈ GX , it is sufficient to
replace the privacy constraint (16b) by
min
1≤g≤M−1,γG◦,g
RG◦,g(pZ|X , γG◦,g) ≥ θ
′
1− δ , (17)
where θ′ = 12
(
1− (1− e−/2)(1− δ)α∆). In other words,
the optimization problem (16) now has M−1 constraints. The
privacy mapping design and results in the next Section IV can
then be generalized accordingly.
Remark 5. Similar to the case of M -ary private hypothe-
ses, suppose that we have multiple nominal binary private
hypotheses (G◦k)
K
k=1, with corresponding uncertainty sets
(G(pX|G◦k , δk))Kk=1. Then, (16b) can be generalized to the
K constraints minγ RG◦k(pZ|X , γ) ≥ θ/(1 − δk), for k =
1, . . . ,K.
IV. PRIVACY MAPPING DESIGN
Since (16) is NP-complete (note that optimizing the objec-
tive is NP-complete [57]), we propose a suboptimal approach
in this section to obtain the privacy mapping pZ|X . We also
derive some properties of this privacy mapping. We consider
both the non-asymptotic case and asymptotic case where the
number of sensors s→∞.
A. Fixed number of sensors
We optimize (16) using PBPO as follows. For a fixed pZ|X ,
we first find the Bayesian detector γH that minimizes the error
in detecting H . Let q\t =
∏
j 6=t qj . Then for each sensor
t = 1, . . . , s, we fix γH , q\t and optimize (16) over all privacy
mappings qt satisfying (1b) to (1d). This process is iterated
until a convergence criterion is satisfied. Let Φ be the set of
deterministic local privacy mappings (a conditional probability
distribution pZt|Xt(· | xt) with all its mass at a particular zt ∈
Z for each xt ∈ X ). The set Φ is finite since |X | · |Z| <∞.
Then, for a fixed q\t, we can write
pZ|X =
∑
φ∈Φ
νφφ · q\t, (18)
7Algorithm 1 PBPO of local privacy mappings.
1: input: pX,H,G◦ , δ, r, ξ
2: initialization:
• Let pt,(0)(z | x) = 1|Z| + nt(z | x),∀z ∈ Z , with
∑
z∈Z nt(z | x) = 0,∀x ∈ X , t = 1, 2, . . . , s.
• For fixed p(0)Z|X =
∏s
t=1 q
(0)
t , optimize θ0 in (20) with likelihood ratio test.
• Set θ = rθ0.
• Set k = −1 and E(0) = 1.
3: repeat
4: (i) k = k + 1.
(ii) Fix p(k)Z|X =
∏s
t=1 q
(k)
t , optimize γ
(k+1)
H to be the Bayes detector of hypothesis H .
(iii) Fix γ(k+1)H and q
(k)
\t =
∏t−1
i=1 q
(k+1)
i ·
∏s
i=t+1 q
(k)
i , for t = 1, 2, . . . , s, solve (19) to find the optimal q
(k+1)
t and the
optimal solution E(k). The linear solver used is [59, Algorithm 2].
5: until E
(k)−E(k+1)
E(k)
≤ ξ.
6: return qt = q
(k+1)
t , t = 1, 2, . . . , s.
where
∑
φ∈Φ νφ = 1, with νφ ≥ 0, for all φ ∈ Φ. Let
LH(pZ|X , γH) be P (γH(Z) 6= H) when the fusion rule for
H is γH and the privacy mapping pZ|X is used. From (18),
we have
LH(pZ|X , γH) =
∑
φ∈Φ
νφLH(φ · q\t, γH).
Similarly,
min
γG◦
R◦G(pZ|X , γ
◦
G) = min
γG◦
∑
φ∈Φ
νφR
◦
G(φ · q\t, γ◦G)
≥
∑
φ∈Φ
νφ min
γG◦
RG◦(φ · q\t, γG◦).
In our PBPO procedure, when optimizing for each sensor
t with a fixed γH and q\t, we solve the following relaxed
optimization problem:
min
νφ
∑
φ∈Φ
νφLH(φ · q\t, γH)
s.t.
∑
φ∈Φ
νφ min
γG◦
RG◦(φ · q\t, γG◦) ≥ θ
1− δ , (19)∑
φ∈Φ
νφ = 1, νφ ≥ 0, ∀φ ∈ Φ.
Proposition 2. The optimal solution of (19) is a randomiza-
tion between at most two deterministic privacy mappings.
Proof: The optimization problem (19) is a linear program,
and has |X | · |Z| variables with |X | · |Z|+2 constraints. From
linear programming theory [16], the number of constraints in
the optimal solution for which equality holds is no smaller
than the number of variables. Therefore, at most two of the
weights {νφ : φ ∈ Φ} are nonzero.
Remark 6. In practice, it may not be easy to know a priori
what privacy budget  to set. Therefore, instead of fixing a
privacy budget  and choosing θ as in (11), we let θ = rθ0,
where r ∈ (0, 1) is called the privacy threshold ratio, and
θ0 = (1− δ) max
pZ|X∈Q
min
γG◦
RG◦(pZ|X , γG◦) (20)
corresponds to the maximal information privacy achievable for
G◦ under the constraints imposed by Q. The maximization
on the right hand side of (20) is achieved by letting qt(zt |
xt) = 1/|Z|, for all zt ∈ Z , xt ∈ X , and t = 1, . . . , s.
With this privacy mapping, it can be shown that Z and G◦
are independent, and
θ0 =
1− δ
2
. (21)
In some applications, we may include additional constraints in
the privacy mapping set Q in order to improve the utility. For
example, we may wish to constrain |qt(zt | xt)− 1/|Z|| ≥ ∆′
for some ∆′ > 0 to avoid a mapping that results in Zt being
independent of H . In this case, θ0 can be found from (20)
using a PBPO approach.
The above discussion on our proposed PBPO approach is
summarized in Algorithm 1. We initialize the privacy mapping
for each sensor t to be q(0)t (z | x) = 1/|Z|+nt(z | x), where
nt(z | x) is a small random noise, satisfying
∑
z∈Z nt(z |
x) = 0, for all x ∈ X . This is done to help the PBPO
procedure avoid local optimum points. For each iteration k, we
perform the PBPO procedure for each sensor t = 1, . . . , s in
order. This is iterated until a convergence criterion is reached.
The optimization problem (19) at each sensor t is a linear
program (LP), which can be solved efficiently in polynomial
time using standard LP solvers. The storage complexity and
time to encode this LP is O(|Z||X |) since each term in the
sums needs to be computed. Its solution time complexity
is at most O((|X ||Z|)2.38 log ξ−10 ), where ξ0 is the relative
accuracy of the LP solver (see [59] for a tighter bound), for
each sensor at each iteration of Algorithm 1.
Proposition 3. Algorithm 1 converges to a critical point.
Proof: In Algorithm 1, since the Bayes error proba-
bility of detecting H is non-increasing in steps 4(ii) and
4(iii), E(k) is non-increasing in each iteration. Since E(k)
is lower bounded, Ek converges. From [60, Proposition 4],
the convergence of E(k) implies the convergence of γH and
qt, t = 1, 2, . . . , s to limit points. By [60, Proposition 5], every
8limit point of γH and qt, t = 1, 2, . . . , s is a critical point for
Algorithm 1. The proposition is now proved.
B. Large number of sensors
In this subsection, we consider the case where the number
of sensors goes to infinity. We assume that the sensor obser-
vations are conditionally i.i.d. given the hypotheses, and every
sensor t uses an identical local privacy mapping qt = q. We
have pZ|X(z | x) =
∏s
t=1 q(zt | xt).
Let Q˜ be the set of privacy mappings q(z|x). For any
q ∈ Q˜ such that Z, H and G◦ are not independent,
the error probabilities minγH P (γH(Z) 6= H) → 0 and
minγ◦G RG◦(pZ|X , γG◦) → 0 exponentially fast as s → ∞
[16], [55]. In particular, we observe that other than using a
trivial mapping that results in the worst case error probability
for detecting H , there is no way to avoid violating the privacy
constraint (6b) for a fixed  budget when s is sufficiently
large. This result follows from [21, Proposition 1(i)] since
minγ◦G RG◦(pZ|X , γG◦) → 0 as s → ∞. Therefore, we con-
sider replacing the objective and constraint in the optimization
problem (16) with their respective error exponents. The error
exponent of (16a) is given by
lim
s→∞−
1
s
log min
γH
P (γH(Z) 6= H)
= CH(p) := − min
λ∈[0,1]
log
∑
z∈Z
pλZ1|H(z | 1)p1−λZ1|H(z | 0),
(22)
while that for (16b) is
lim
s→∞−
1
s
log min
γ◦G
RG◦(pZ|X , γG◦)
= C◦G(p) := − min
λ∈[0,1]
log
∑
z∈Z
pλZ1|G◦(z | 1)p1−λZ1|G◦(z | 0).
(23)
We then obtain the optimization problem
max
p∈Q˜
CH(p) (24a)
s.t. CG◦(p) ≤ β, (24b)
for some β > 0. The constraint (24b) is a privacy rate
constraint that prevents the average error probability of in-
ferring any G ∈ GX from decaying faster than a fixed rate
β as s→∞. This corresponds to preventing the information
privacy leakage of any G ∈ GX from worsening faster than a
predefined rate.
Proposition 4. There is no loss in optimality in (24) if we
restrict |Z| ≤ |X |+ 1.
Proof: For any p ∈ Q˜, we have
e−CH(p) =
∑
z∈Z
pZ1(z)dH(z),
e−CG◦ (p) =
∑
z∈Z
pZ1(z)d
◦
G(z),
where
dH(z) =
pH|Z1(0 | z)
pH(0)
(
pH|Z1(1 | z)pH(0)
pH|Z1(0 | z)pH(1)
)λ1
,
dG◦(z) =
pG◦|Z1(0 | z)
pG◦(0)
(
pG|Z1(1 | z)pG◦(0)
pG◦|Z1(0 | z)pG◦(1)
)λ2
,
λ1 = arg min
λ∈(0,1)
log
∑
z∈Z
pλZ1|H(z | 1)p1−λZ1|H(z | 0),
λ2 = arg min
λ∈(0,1)
log
∑
z∈Z
pλZ1|G◦(z | 1)p1−λZ1|G◦(z | 0).
For each z ∈ Z , let wz be the vector (pX1|Z1(x | z))x∈X . We
can then write∑
z∈Z
pZ1(z)[wz, dH(z), dG◦(z)] = [pX1 , e
−CH(p), e−CG◦ (p)].
The vector [pX1 , e
−CH(p), e−CG◦ (p)] belongs to a space with
dimension |X | + 1. From Carathéodory’s theorem [61, Ap-
pendix C], since wz, dH(z), dG◦(z) are real-valued continuous
functions of pX1|Z1(·|z), we can find Z ′1 such that
|{z : pZ′1(z) 6= 0}| ≤ |X |+ 1,
and∑
z∈Z
pZ′1(z)[wz, dH(z), dG◦(z)] = [pX1 , e
−CH(p), e−CG◦ (p)].
The proposition now follows.
Recall that Φ is the set of deterministic local privacy
mappings. Any p ∈ Q˜ can be written as a randomization of
deterministic mappings or the convex combination
∑
φ∈Φ νφφ,
where νφ ≥ 0 for all φ ∈ Φ and
∑
φ νφ = 1. We now
consider the case where each sensor performs independent
randomization over Φ [15], and reports its choice of privacy
mapping to the fusion center.
Proposition 5. Suppose that each sensor performs indepen-
dent randomization over Φ. Then, the optimal solution of (24)
is a randomization between at most two deterministic decision
rules.
Proof: From [16, Lemma 1], for J ∈ {H,G◦}, we have
lim
s→∞
1
s
log minP (γJ(Z) 6= J) = − min
λ∈[0,1]
∑
φ∈Φ
νφµJ(φ, λ),
where
µJ(φ, λ) = log
∑
z∈Z
uλJ(φ, z, 1)u
1−λ
J (φ, z, 0),
uJ(φ, z, j) =
∑
x∈φ−1(z)
pX|J(x | j).
Therefore, (24) can be reformulated as
min
νφ,λ1∈[0,1]
∑
φ∈Φ
νφµH(φ, λ1)
s.t. min
λ2∈[0,1]
∑
φ∈Φ
νφµG◦(φ, λ2) ≥ −β,
νφ ≥ 0,∀φ ∈ Φ,
∑
φ∈Φ
νφ = 1.
(25)
9For any fixed λ1 and λ2, the linear program (25) has |Z| · |X |
variables with |Z| · |X |+ 2 constraints. From linear program-
ming theory [16], the number of constraints in the optimal
solution for which equality holds is no smaller than the number
of variables. Therefore, at most two of the νφ’s are nonzero,
and the proposition is proved.
V. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we carry out simulation to provide insights
into how different parameters impact the performance of our
proposed approaches. We first consider a network of 4 sensors
and a fusion center, with X = {1, 2, . . . , 16}, and Z = {1, 2}.
We generate different pX,H,G◦ and calculate numerically the
upper and lower bounds in Theorem 1. We set I(X;H|G◦) =
4×10−6 and impose an information privacy budget  = 0.01.
Different pX,H,G◦ with different mutual information I(X;H)
are generated to test the performance of the bound. From
Fig. 2, we see that the difference between the upper and lower
bounds become tighter when I(X;H) is large. Furthermore,
the upper bound is tighter than the lower bound.
Fig. 2: Upper and lower bounds in Theorem 1 and
P (γH(Z 6= H)) calculated by Algorithm 1 with varying
I(X;H).
We set the correlation coefficient between the public hy-
pothesis H and nominal private hypothesis G◦ to be 0.2. The
joint distribution pX1,H,G◦ at sensor 1 is shown in Fig. 3. We
assume that all sensors have the same joint distribution and
are independent of each other conditioned on (H,G◦).
In our first simulation, we set the privacy threshold ratio
r = 0.7 and δ = 0.54 in Algorithm 1 to obtain the privacy
mapping pZ|X . In Fig. 4, we visualize the distribution of Z
conditioned on different hypotheses, including the nominal
private hypothesis G◦, the MFH GMF (constructed using
Theorem 2), and the public hypothesis H . We observe that
pZ|G◦(· | 0) and pZ|G◦(· | 1) are relatively similar to
each other, which implies that Z does not provide much
statistical information about G◦. For the MFH GMF, we have
a similar observation that pZ|GMF(· | 0) and pZ|GMF(· | 1)
are relatively similar to each other except at Z = (0, 0, 0, 0)
Fig. 3: Joint distribution pX1,H,G◦ of sensor observation X1,
public hypothesis H , and private hypothesis G◦. The correla-
tion coefficient between H and G◦ is 0.2.
Fig. 4: Conditional probability distribution of Z =
(Z1, . . . , Z4) given different hypotheses. The horizontal axis
shows the decimal form of the binary word Z1Z2Z3Z4.
and Z = (1, 1, 1, 1), which makes the MFH the easiest to
distinguish amongst all hypotheses in GZ . In this case, we
find that the privacy budget  = 2.4. We also observe that
pZ|H(· | 0) and pZ|H(· | 1) are significantly different from
each other, which implies that H can still be inferred from
Z with good accuracy. We also show the privacy mapping at
sensor 1 in Fig. 5 as an example.
In Fig. 6, we show the Bayes error rates of detecting H and
GMF with different privacy threshold ratios r and uncertainty
parameters δ. We let the privacy threshold θ = (1 − δ)r/2
as given by (21). We see that the our proposed Algorithm 1
yields privacy mappings that allow the fusion center to detect
the public hypothesis H with low error, while keeping the
error for any private hypothesis G ∈ GX high. As expected,
the Bayes error of detecting all hypotheses increases as the
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Fig. 5: Privacy mapping at sensor 1, with r = 0.7 and δ =
0.54.
(a) Detecting H .
(b) Detecting G◦ and GMF
Fig. 6: Bayes error probability of detecting H , G◦ and
GMF with different privacy threshold ratio r and uncertainty
parameter δ.
threshold ratio r increases. Furthermore, the performance of
our proposed Algorithm 1 improves with smaller uncertainty
parameter δ. This is intuitive since a larger δ implies a stricter
privacy constraint.
Fig. 7: Bayes error of detecting H , G◦ and GMF with varying
correlation coefficient between H and G◦.
Let ρH,G◦ denote the correlation coefficient between H and
G◦. In Fig. 7, we fix θ = 0.7 and vary ρH,G◦ . We see that if
ρH,G◦ is small, the Bayes error of detecting H is much smaller
than the Bayes error of detecting any G ∈ GZ . However, if
H and G◦ are highly correlated, the Bayes error of detecting
H is close to that of G◦, and greater than that of detecting
GMF. This is because GMF is the MFH in GZ , and yields the
smallest detection error amongst all G ∈ GZ .
A. Asymptotically Large Number of Sensors
Next, we plot the error exponents of detecting H and G◦
as the number of sensors s→∞ in Fig. 8. We use the same
sensor observation distribution as in Fig. 3 and set β = 0.04.
We solve the optimization problem (24) using PBPO and
Proposition 5 to obtain the optimal privacy mapping. We see
that as the correlation coefficient between H and G◦ increases,
the error exponent of detecting H decreases and approaches
the error exponent of detecting G◦.
In Fig. 9, we study the accuracy-privacy tradeoff with
varying |Z|. We set the sensor observation set cardinality
|X | = 6, and β = 0.05. We consider the low-correlation
case where ρH,G◦ = 0.2, and the high-correlation case where
ρH,G◦ = 0.8. We see that as |Z| increases, the error exponent
of detecting H increases and stays constant for |Z| sufficiently
large. The point where the error exponent becomes constant
is larger for smaller correlation coefficient ρH,G◦ . The results
in Fig. 9 also verify Proposition 4.
B. Comparisons
Finally, we compare our proposed approach with approaches
using other types of privacy metrics. We set ρH,G◦ = 0.2,
and vary the distribution of X so that the conditional mutual
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Fig. 8: Error exponent for detecting H and G◦ with varying
correlation coefficient between H and G◦.
Fig. 9: Error exponent for detecting H and G◦ with varying
|Z|.
information I(X;H|G◦) varies accordingly. We consider the
following three privacy metrics for comparison.
Definition 4 (Average information leakage [23]). Let A ≥ 0.
We say that A-average information leakage is achieved if
I(G◦;Z) ≤ A.
Definition 5 (Maximal leakage [37]). Let ML ≥ 0.
We say that ML-maximal leakage privacy is achieved if
supG log
maxγ P(γ(Z)=G)
maxg pG(g)
≤ ML.
Definition 6 (Local differential privacy [31]). Let L ≥ 0.
We say that L-local differential privacy is achieved if for all
neighboring x,x′ ∈ X s, and z ∈ Zs, pZ|X(z|x)pZ|X(z|x′) ≤ eL .
Average information leakage aims at limiting the mutual
information between the private hypothesis G and the sensor
local decisions Z. Maximal leakage guarantees the Bayes error
probability of detecting any private hypothesis to be large.
Both privacy metrics prevent the fusion center from guessing
the private hypothesis. Local differential privacy, on the other
hand, prevents the fusion center from inferring the sensor
observations ensuring that the sensor decision Z = z and
Z = z′ corresponding to neighboring sensor observations
X = x and X = x′ respectively are statistically similar. Here,
x and x′ are said to be neighboring observations if the two
vectors differ at only one component.
The approaches we compare against when δ = 0 (i.e.,
GX = {G◦}) are optimization formulations to achieve the
minimum detection error while guaranteeing A-average infor-
mation privacy and L-local differential privacy respectively.
This ensures fair comparison as these approaches deal only
with a single private hypothesis. We solve the optimization
problem (19) with the privacy constraint replaced by either the
average information leakage constraint or the maximal leakage
constraint, respectively. When δ > 0, we compare against the
optimization formulation [37, (3)] reproduced as follows:
max
pZ|X
D
( ∑
x∈X s
pZ|X(z|x)pX|G(x|0)
||
∑
x∈X s
pZ|X(z|x)pX|G(x|1)
)
s.t.
∑
z∈Zs
pZ|X(z|x) = 1,∀x ∈ X s
pZ|X(z|x) ≥ 0,∀z ∈ Zs,x ∈ X s,
where D(·||·) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence. We approx-
imate the problem in the high privacy domain, where the opti-
mal pZ|X satisfies the following conditions [37, Theorem 3]:
1) The optimal pZ|X contains two unique columns. One
of them has value eML − 1 when x ∈ I+ ∆= {x :
pX|G(x|1)−pX|G(x|0) ≥ 0}. Another has value eML−1
when x ∈ I− ∆= {x : pX|G(x|1)− pX|G(x|0) ≤ 0}.
2) Other columns have the same entry in each row, and each
row sums to 1.
This optimization problem guarantees ML-maximal leak-
age privacy in the worst case private hypothesis.
In Fig. 10, we choose the privacy thresholds and budgets for
the different metrics so that the Bayes error for detecting the
private hypothesis G◦ is the same for all metrics when δ = 0.
Similarly, when δ > 0, we set the Bayes error for detecting
GMF to be the same across the metrics under comparison.
We see that the Bayes error for detecting H decreases as
I(X;H | G◦) increases. As expected, our proposed approach
using information privacy as the privacy metric yields the
minimum Bayes error for detecting H . By comparison, the
approach using average information leakage has a slightly
higher Bayes error for detecting H . The approach using local
differential privacy has a significantly larger Bayes error for
detecting H , since local differential privacy protects the data
privacy of the sensor observations X and does not distinguish
between statistical inferences for H and G◦. For the δ > 0
comparison, the maximal leakage privacy formulation (3) in
[37] achieves the worst performance because it considers
the strictest privacy criterion using the worst-case private
hypothesis G. This serves as a benchmark upper bound for
our utility performance if we let δ → 1 in our uncertainty set
GX .
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Fig. 10: Bayes error for detecting H and G◦ with varying
conditional mutual information I(X;H | G◦).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have developed an approach to achieve
information privacy for an uncertainty set of private hypothe-
ses in a decentralized detection framework. We provided
bounds for the utility of detecting the public hypothesis. We
introduced the concept of a MFH of the uncertainty set of
private hypotheses, and showed how to find a MFH, which
allows us to transform the information privacy constraint into
a more tractable metric that uses the average of the Type I
and II error probabilities of detecting the MFH. We proposed
a PBPO algorithm to find the local privacy mappings at each
sensor. Simulations indicate that our approach produces higher
error in detecting the private hypotheses, while maintaining a
reasonably low error for detecting the public hypothesis.
A future research direction is to consider our robust infor-
mation privacy framework in the context of sequential sensor
observations over time. Another interesting direction is to
consider information privacy preservation in different network
architectures like tree and tandem networks [62]–[66]. In this
paper, we have assumed that the family of joint distributions
between sensor observations and the hypotheses are known. In
applications where such a priori knowledge is not available,
we can use a similar approach as in [21] to convert the
objective (16a) and privacy constraint (16b) into empirical risk
versions. Then, a nonparametric learning approach can be ap-
plied to learn the local sensor privacy mappings. An interesting
future research direction is to characterize the utility-privacy
tradeoff in this nonparametric learning framework.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
If pi = 0, the proposition trivially holds. We now assume
that pi > 0 so that 0 < δ < 1 from (4). Consider a G ∈ Fpi .
For any g ∈ {0, 1}, let g¯ = 1− g and for any x ∈ X s, let
fg(x) =
1
δ
(pX|G(x | g)− (1− δ)pX|G◦(x | g)).
To prove the proposition, it suffices to show that fg(x) ≥ 0
since
∑
x fg(x) = 1. We have
pX|G◦(x | g) = pX,G
◦,G(x, g, g)∑
g′=0,1 pG◦,G(g, g
′)
+
pX,G◦,G(x, g, g¯)
pG◦(g)
≤ pX|G◦,G(x | g, g) + pX,G
◦,G(x, g, g¯)
pG◦(g)
≤ pX|G◦,G(x | g, g) + pG|G◦(g¯ | g),
and
pX|G(x | g) =
∑
g′=0,1
pX|G◦,G(x | g′, g)pG◦|G(g′ | g)
≥ pG◦|G(g | g)(pX|G◦(x | g)− pG|G◦(g¯ | g)).
(26)
We also have
pG◦|G(g¯ | g) =
pG|G◦(g | g¯)pG◦(g¯)
pG(g)
≤ pipG◦(g¯)∑
g′=0,1 pG|G◦(g | g′)pG◦(g′)
≤ pipG◦(g¯)
pG|G◦(g | g)pG◦(g)
≤ pipG◦(g¯)
(1− pi)pG◦(g) . (27)
From (26) and (27), we obtain
fg(x) =
1
δ
(pX|G(x | g)− (1− δ)pX|G◦(x | g))
≥ 1
δ
( pG◦(g)− pi
(1− pi)pG◦(g) (pX|G◦(x | g)− pi)
− (1− δ)pX|G◦(x | g)
)
=
pX|G◦(x | g)
δ
(
pG◦(g)− pi
(1− pi)pG◦(g)
(
1− pi
pX|G◦(x | g)
)
− 1 + δ
)
≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows from (4). The proposition is
now proved.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
It can be shown that
min
γH ,pZ|X
P (γH(Z) 6= H)
=
1
2
− 1
2
max
pZ|X
∥∥pZ|H(· | 0)− pZ|H(· | 1)∥∥TV . (28)
We prove the theorem by bounding the total variation term in
(28). We first prove the lower bound. From Pinsker’s inequality
[67], we have
1
2
(∑
z
|pZ|H(z | 1)− pZ(z)|
)2
≤
∑
z
pZ|H(z | 1) log
pZ|H(z | 1)
pZ(z)
(29)
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and
1
2
(∑
z
|pZ|H(z | 0)− pZ(z)|
)2
≤
∑
z
pZ|H(z | 0) log
pZ|H(z | 0)
pZ(z)
. (30)
From (29) and (30), we obtain
I(H;Z)
≥1
4
(∑
z
1
2
|pZ|H(z | 1)− pZ|H(z | 0)|
)2
+
1
4
(∑
z
1
2
|pZ|H(z | 1)− pZ|H(z | 0)|
)2
=
1
2
∥∥pZ|H(· | 1)− pZ|H(· | 0)∥∥2TV . (31)
We have
I(H;Z) = I(H;Z | G◦) + I(G◦;Z)− I(G◦;Z | H)
≤ I(H;X | G◦) + I(G◦;Z)
≤ I(H;X | G◦) + , (32)
where the last inequality follows from I(G◦;Z) =∑
z,g pZ,G◦(z, g) log(pG◦|Z(g | z)/p◦G(g)) ≤  and (6b). From
(31) and (32), we obtain∥∥pZ|H(· | 1)− pZ|H(· | 0)∥∥TV
≤
√
2I(H;Z)
≤
√
2I(H;X | G◦) + ,
and the lower bound in (8) follows from (28).
We next prove the upper bound. Fix a subset of Γ ∈ Zs,
and consider a pZ|X such that
pZ|X(z | x) =
{
A, x ∈ I+, z ∈ Γ
B, x ∈ I−, z ∈ Γ ,
pZ|X(z | x) =
{
B, x ∈ I+, z ∈ Γc
A, x ∈ I−, z ∈ Γc
for some A,B ≥ 0. We then have∥∥pZ|H(· | 0)− pZ|H(· | 1)∥∥TV
=
1
2
∑
z
|pZ|H(z | 0)− pZ|H(z | 1)| (33)
=
1
2
∑
z
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x
(pX|H(x | 0)− pX|H(x | 1))pZ|X(z | x)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
z∈Γ
∣∣∣∣A ∑
x∈I+
(pX|H(x | 0)− pX|H(x | 1))
+B
∑
x∈I−
(pX|H(x | 0)− pX|H(x | 1))
∣∣∣∣
+
1
2
∑
z∈Γc
∣∣∣∣B ∑
x∈I+
(pX|H(x | 0)− pX|H(x | 1))
+A
∑
x∈I−
(pX|H(x | 0)− pX|H(x | 1))
∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
|Z|s|A−B|∥∥pX|H(· | 0)− pX|H(· | 1)∥∥TV , (34)
where (34) holds since∑
x∈I+
(pX|H(x | 0)− pX|H(x | 1))
= −
∑
x∈I−
(pX|H(x | 0)− pX|H(x | 1))
=
∥∥pX|H(· | 0)− pX|H(· | 1)∥∥TV .
To obtain the upper bound in (8), we find A ≥ B that
max
A,B
A−B
s.t.
e− ≤ A
∑
x∈I+ pX|G(x | g) +B
∑
x∈I− pX|G(x | g)
A
∑
x∈I+ pX(x;G) +B
∑
x∈I− pX(x;G)
≤ e,
e− ≤ B
∑
x∈I+ pX|G(x | g) +A
∑
x∈I− pX|G(x | g)
B
∑
x∈I+ pX(x;G) +A
∑
x∈I− pX(x;G)
≤ e,
for g = 0, 1, and all G ∈ GX ,
A ≥ 0, B ≥ 0, A+B = 2|Z|s .
If we fix a G ∈ GX , and let AG and BG be the corresponding
A and B of the above optimization problem, we obtain the
linear program:
max
AG,BG
AG −BG
s.t. aG(g)AG + bG(g)BG ≤ 0,
bG(g)AG + aG(g)BG ≤ 0,
cG(g)AG + dG(g)BG ≤ 0,
dG(g)AG + cG(g)BG ≤ 0,
for g = 0, 1,
AG ≥ 0, BG ≥ 0,
AG +BG =
2
|Z|s ,
whose solution can be shown to be the following: Let
F = {(aG(g),bG(g)), (bG(g), aG(g)),
(cG(g), dG(g)), (dG(g), cG(g)), g = 0, 1}.
1) If there exists a pair (f1, f2) ∈ F such that f1 > 0 and
f2 < 0, then we find a pair (f∗1 , f
∗
2 ) from F such that
f∗1 > 0 and f
∗
2 < 0 and that minimizes f
∗
1 /f
∗
2 . We obtain
AG =
−2f∗2
|Z|s(f∗1 − f∗2 )
,
BG =
2f∗1
|Z|s(f∗1 − f∗2 )
,
and therefore AG −BG = 2(e
−1)
|Z|s(f∗1−f∗2 ) , which is equiva-
lent to
AG −BG
=
2(e − 1)
|Z|s max{|aG(g)− bG(g)|, |cG(g)− dG(g)| : g ∈ {0, 1}} .
14
2) If there does not exist any pairs (f1, f2) ∈ F such that
f1 > 0 and f2 < 0, we let AG = 2|Z|s and BG = 0 to
obtain AG −BG = 2|Z|s .
From (34) and combining the two cases above, we obtain∥∥pZ|H(· | 0)− pZ|H(· | 1)∥∥TV
≥ (e
 − 1)∥∥pX|H(· | 0)− pX|H(· | 1)∥∥TV
max{mG, e − 1} ,
for any G ∈ GX . Maximizing over all G ∈ GX , we obtain the
upper bound in (8). The proof of the theorem is now complete.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
If δ = 0, the theorem trivially holds. Suppose that 0 < δ <
1. It is easy to check that (15) defines a probability distribution
in GZ . For any G ∈ GZ , let
ΓG = {z : `Z|G(z) ≥ 1}.
We have `Z|G◦(z) ≤ 1 ≤ `Z|G◦(z¯), and
A1 >
pZ|G◦(z | 0)
pZ|G◦(z | 1) =
1
`Z|G◦(z)
≥ 1,
A2 >
pZ|G◦(z¯ | 1)
pZ|G◦(z¯ | 0) = `Z|G
◦(z¯) ≥ 1,
which yields the following observations:
• `Z|GMF(z¯) = A2 > 1 and `Z|G◦(z¯) > 1.
• `Z|GMF(z) = 1/A1 < 1 and `Z|G◦(z) < 1.
• For z 6= z, z¯, we have `Z|GMF(z) = `Z|G◦(z).
Therefore we have
ΓG◦ = ΓGMF . (35)
For any G ∈ GZ , we have
RG(pZ|X , γ∗G)
=
1
2
(
P (Z ∈ ΓG | G = 0) + P (Z ∈ ΓcG | G = 1)
)
≥ (1− δ)
2
(
P (Z ∈ ΓG | G◦ = 0)
+ P (Z ∈ ΓcG | G◦ = 1)
)
(36)
≥ (1− δ)
2
(
P (Z ∈ ΓG◦ | G◦ = 0)
+ P (Z ∈ ΓcG◦ | G◦ = 1)
)
(37)
=
(1− δ)
2
(
P (Z ∈ ΓGMF | G◦ = 0)
+ P
(
Z ∈ ΓcGMF | G◦ = 1
) )
(38)
=
1
2
(
P (Z ∈ ΓGMF | GMF = 0)
+ P
(
Z ∈ ΓcGMF | GMF = 1
) )
(39)
= RGMF(pZ|X , γ
∗
GMF),
where
• (36) follows from the definition of GZ ;
• (37) is because ΓG◦ is the optimal critical region that
minimizes RG◦(pZ|X , ·);
• (38) follows from (35); and
• (39) follows from (15).
Therefore, RGMF(pZ|X , γ
∗
GMF
) = minG∈GZ RG(pZ|X , γ
∗
G).
Furthermore, from (37), we obtain RGMF(pZ|X , γ
∗
GMF
) =
(1− δ)RG◦(pZ|X , γ∗G◦), and the theorem is proved.
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